In my previous article, Geopolitics in the Time of Monsters, I wrote about Alexander Mercouris’s presentation at the Kyoto University Symposium 2026. His argument was that the international system is going through a historical shift. Europe is slowly losing the central position it held for centuries, while other countries and civilizations gain influence over global politics, economics, and strategy. One question stayed with me afterward: can institutions built for an earlier distribution of power recognize a world that no longer runs on their assumptions? That’s especially hard when those assumptions are deeply embedded in how governments read events and understand their own responsibilities.
I kept exploring talks from the same symposium, Geopolitics in the Time of Monsters, held at Kyoto University from October 14 to 16, 2026. One of them approached the same transformation from a different angle, through China’s foreign policy and its tangled relationships in the Middle East. The speaker was Chinese researcher Sheng Zhang, whose academic work focuses on China’s international relations, especially its ties with Iran. What caught my attention was that he didn’t describe China as a perfectly coordinated actor following one strategy. He described a country whose foreign policy still carries different historical traditions, economic priorities, political commitments, and strategic calculations. They don’t always lead to the same conclusions.
In his presentation, published by Neutrality Studies on October 19, 2026, Zhang argues that Chinese foreign policy is shaped by two traditions that exist side by side.
One belongs to Mao Zedong: anti-imperialism and support for national liberation struggles. The other belongs to Deng Xiaoping: economic reform, and trade, investment, and technology cooperation with countries regardless of their politics. Both remain influential under Xi Jinping. But Zhang believes the intensifying conflicts in the Middle East are making it harder for them to coexist, especially when Beijing’s political relationships don’t match its economic interests.
I find this interesting because we tend to talk about countries as if they were single people with one mind and one set of interests.
Zhang’s talk lets us look at some of those differences inside China. It also raises a bigger question about multipolarity. As countries gain influence, will they get better at managing their overlapping relationships? Or will they run into the same contradictions that have complicated the foreign policies of other great powers throughout history?
Two Historical Traditions Within the Same Country
Zhang starts with the Mao era, when Chinese foreign policy was driven by revolutionary internationalism, opposition to colonial domination, and support for movements seeking independence. These positions grew out of China’s own history of foreign intervention, Japanese aggression, internal struggle, and the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. They also reflected the Cold War, when Beijing was trying to carve out a role separate from the Western powers and, at times, from the Soviet Union.
His main example is China’s relationship with the Palestinian national movement. It became part of Beijing’s engagement with the Middle East long before China built the commercial ties it has in the region today. According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official history of China-Palestine relations, the Palestine Liberation Organization opened a representative office in Beijing in May 1965, with diplomatic privileges and immunity. China formally recognized the State of Palestine on November 20, 1988, and upgraded the PLO office to an embassy on December 31 of that year.
Zhang connects this to Mao’s view of the world. Struggles in different places weren’t isolated regional events. They were pieces of a wider confrontation over colonialism, sovereignty, and power. In the talk, he mentions Mao’s meetings with Palestinian representatives and shows children’s books from the Cultural Revolution. In those books, Palestinian characters are portrayed through images shaped by China’s own war against Japan. It’s a good illustration of how a distant conflict could become part of domestic education and culture, read through experiences Chinese society already knew.
Then came a major shift under Deng Xiaoping. The leadership focused on domestic development and integration into global markets. Raising living standards, building industry, and gaining technology meant working with countries that had resources, capital, or markets, even when their politics and alliances were very different from China’s.
Zhang calls this the Dengist tradition. It put the practical economic results of diplomacy first and avoided political fights that might get in the way of development. The Middle East drew Beijing’s interest for historical solidarity, but also as a source of energy, a market for Chinese goods, and a place for investment, construction, and technology cooperation.
The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Israel on January 24, 1992 shows this shift clearly. Beijing could build commercial and technological ties with Israel while still recognizing Palestine and backing Palestinian self-determination. Over time, Chinese companies expanded abroad, and relationships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf countries grew in weight as China became one of the world’s largest manufacturing economies.
What I find useful in Zhang’s comparison is that the two traditions weren’t necessarily incompatible, as long as China didn’t have to choose between its political positions and its economic relationships. Supporting Palestinian statehood didn’t stop Chinese companies from trading with Israel. A strategic partnership with Iran didn’t stop Beijing from building commercial ties with Saudi Arabia or the UAE.
This distinction is also part of Zhang’s academic work. In his 2026 article, Achilles’ Heel: Self-Contradictions in the BRI’s Middle East Agendas Aggravate Limitations of the Iran-China Partnership, published in Asian Perspective, he looks at the tension between China’s strategic goals and the economic priorities of the Belt and Road Initiative. His argument is that the lack of a clear hierarchy between political and commercial goals has caused problems in Beijing’s relationship with Tehran.
From Economic Cooperation to Political Mediation
Zhang argues that Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East became more politically active under Xi Jinping. Earlier, during the reform period, Beijing mostly preferred to expand economic cooperation without taking responsibility for settling regional political disputes.
One example came on March 10, 2023, when Saudi Arabia and Iran announced in Beijing that they would restore diplomatic relations after talks hosted by China. The joint statement issued by the three governments included commitments to reopen embassies, respect sovereignty, avoid interfering in each other’s internal affairs, and revive earlier bilateral agreements. It also acknowledged the earlier mediation efforts of Iraq and Oman, which had hosted Saudi-Iranian talks before the Beijing negotiations.
Another example followed in July 2024, when China hosted representatives of fourteen Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas. They signed the Beijing Declaration on Ending Division and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity. The declaration didn’t resolve the long-standing divisions among Palestinian groups, and how it would be carried out stayed unclear. Still, the meeting showed that Beijing was willing to get more directly involved in regional political disputes.
Zhang reads these moves as a shift in Chinese foreign policy. I think there’s another explanation worth considering. China’s expanded diplomacy may partly be a result of the economic ties it already has. Regional instability threatens Chinese investments, energy supplies, transport networks, and trade. So more political involvement doesn’t necessarily mean ideology is replacing economics. Mediation can serve commercial, security, and political goals at once.
The Saudi-Iranian deal shows how relationships with rival governments can open doors for negotiation. But deeper diplomatic involvement also brings expectations that are harder to meet when partners disagree over sovereignty, military operations, or alliances. A country that wants good relations with several governments may find that each one expects political support the others wouldn’t accept.
Palestine, Historical Memory, and China’s Economic Relationship with Israel
One of the more revealing parts of the talk is about Chinese historical memory and how people in China discuss Palestine today. International events can take on meanings that go well beyond diplomatic agreements or immediate strategic interests.
Zhang showed Chinese artwork and online commentary comparing Palestinians’ experience with China’s experience of Japanese occupation and violence in the Second World War. In his reading, these comparisons show that resistance to foreign domination still holds a central place in Chinese national identity. He also suggests that some younger Chinese internet users have gone back to Maoist-era intellectual and cultural material when discussing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
I understand the mechanism. People rarely interpret international events through facts alone. Education, family history, culture, and the political environment they grew up in all shape what they see. A conflict thousands of kilometers away can feel personal when it echoes something in your own society’s collective memory. But the existence of such comparisons doesn’t prove the historical situations are equivalent. And the views of selected internet users don’t show what the Chinese population as a whole thinks.
Zhang also points to differences in the language Chinese officials and government publications use about Israel’s military operations in Gaza. He sees them as a sign that Chinese institutions don’t all express political positions with the same caution. One example is the State Council Information Office’s Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2024, released in August 2025, which he contrasts with the wording of foreign ministry communications. He takes this as evidence of competing orientations within the Chinese system. To me, differences in institutional roles and diplomatic audiences could explain some of that variation too.
Legal terminology around Gaza needs care, because political statements, independent investigations, and court proceedings are different kinds of evidence. In September 2025, a United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry concluded that Israel had committed genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. Israel rejected that conclusion. South Africa’s separate case at the International Court of Justice was still ongoing, and the Court’s May 2026 procedural order set additional deadlines for written submissions. Keep the two apart: a commission’s findings are not a final judgment by the ICJ.
Beyond statements, Zhang points to a practical tension. Beijing keeps large economic interests in a country whose policies it criticizes, and whose conflict with the Palestinians has become a prominent subject in Chinese diplomacy.
One example is Haifa Bayport, a container terminal operated by SIPG Bayport Terminal, a subsidiary of the Shanghai International Port Group. It began operations on September 1, 2021. Running major ports gives Chinese companies long-term openings in logistics and trade. But the project also shows how infrastructure investments become exposed to geopolitical risk when regional security worsens or diplomatic relations sour.
Zhang argues that worsening political relations between China and Israel could eventually hurt Chinese investments and commercial ties. His concern about Haifa Bayport is a risk assessment, though. It doesn’t mean China has lost the concession or that the investment has failed.
The trade data is also more complicated than a clean economic separation. According to Tomer Fadlon’s analysis, Trends in Israel-China Trade in 2024, published by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies in May 2025, goods trade between the two countries, excluding diamonds, reached roughly $16.3 billion in 2024. That’s an increase of 11.7 percent over 2023. Israeli imports from China grew by about 20 percent, while Israeli exports to China kept falling. So the relationship stayed substantial despite political disagreements, even as the trade became more lopsided.
During the audience discussion, one participant asked whether China had done enough to turn its political support for Palestinians into material aid or economic measures against Israel. It’s the old gap between declarations and actions that cost something. Zhang accepted the criticism and suggested rising tensions could eventually change China’s economic approach to Israel. But that’s a prediction, not an established policy decision.
The problem isn’t unique to China. Economic cooperation doesn’t mean agreeing with every policy of the other government. Political support for a cause doesn’t automatically dictate which commercial ties a state must keep or cut. These decisions involve legal obligations, economic consequences, diplomatic commitments, domestic expectations, and different ideas about what meaningful support actually looks like.
Iran, the Gulf States, and the Limits of Strategic Partnership
If Palestine and Israel show the tension between political commitments and economic cooperation, Iran gives Zhang an even messier example. China’s relationship with Tehran involves real strategic cooperation, but it’s also shaped by Beijing’s extensive ties with Iran’s regional rivals.
China and Iran established a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2016 and signed a 25-year cooperation agreement in March 2021. Iran’s accession as a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2023 added another institutional link. These steps strengthened the relationship and opened room for long-term cooperation. But a strategic partnership is not a military alliance, and it doesn’t oblige either side to back everything the other does.
Meanwhile, China’s commercial ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf countries are extensive. They involve energy imports, infrastructure, construction, finance, and the Gulf’s place in global transport networks. So Beijing has strong reasons to keep good relations with governments whose interests sometimes clash with Tehran’s, even though Iran’s strategic value can’t be measured by trade figures alone.
Zhang illustrates the problem with the dispute over Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, three Persian Gulf islands controlled by Iran and claimed by the UAE. In June 2024, Iran summoned China’s ambassador after a joint China-UAE statement about the islands. Reuters reported on the diplomatic disagreement. Tehran saw the statement as inconsistent with its territorial position and with what a strategic partnership should involve. Beijing maintained that the dispute should be resolved through dialogue and consultation.
From Iran’s side, a strategic partner should show political solidarity on questions of national sovereignty. From China’s side, cooperation with Iran doesn’t cancel its interest in good relations with the UAE or Saudi Arabia. Both positions reflect real national interests, and diplomatic language can’t always reconcile them. A statement meant to keep one government happy can easily read as too little support to another.
This ties directly into Zhang’s argument about the Belt and Road Initiative. Infrastructure and trade projects can deepen economic ties without settling the political disputes between the countries involved. The same commercial integration that increases China’s influence can also limit its freedom of action, because Beijing becomes exposed to competing demands from governments that treat their own disputes as questions of fundamental national interest.
The 2026 Iran Conflict and China’s Strategic Calculations
The 2026 conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States is another big part of Zhang’s analysis. He argues that it changed how Chinese policymakers judged Iran’s political resilience and long-term strategic value.
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched military strikes against Iran, following renewed tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and regional security. Zhang suggests Beijing approached the situation cautiously at first. Chinese policymakers weren’t sure Iran could keep its political and institutional continuity under heavy military pressure, especially after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria showed how quickly regional relationships can change.
In Zhang’s reading, Iran’s ability to keep functioning during the conflict made Chinese decision-makers rethink its value as a partner. He therefore expects closer diplomatic and economic cooperation between Beijing and Tehran. But that’s his explanation of Chinese policymaking. It isn’t established by public evidence about internal government deliberations.
China’s recorded diplomatic behavior is more complicated than unconditional alignment with Iran. On March 11, 2026, Beijing abstained on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2817. It condemned Iranian attacks against Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan. Russia also abstained, and the other thirteen Council members voted in favor.
On April 7, China and Russia vetoed a separate draft resolution on commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. According to Reuters’ account of the vote, the proposal encouraged coordination to protect shipping and had been revised during negotiations. Beijing and Moscow argued the text was still unbalanced and risked legitimizing further military action. The United States and several other governments criticized the vetoes.
These votes were on different proposals in different circumstances, so they don’t prove China moved from neutrality to unrestricted support for Iran. Beijing’s official position also kept emphasizing broader principles. In Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s statement on March 8, 2026, he called for an immediate end to hostilities, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran and the Gulf countries, protection of civilians, non-interference in internal affairs, and renewed negotiations.
Zhang still argues that Iran holds a central place in China’s wider strategy, because the Middle East affects where American diplomatic and military resources go. The United States has major security commitments in both the Middle East and East Asia, so prolonged regional instability can limit how much attention and resources Washington can put into competing with China in the Pacific.
It’s a familiar idea in international relations: a country’s strategic value can depend on how its actions shape the commitments of other major powers, not just on its direct economic ties. But the effects of regional instability can’t be measured only by what it costs the United States. Disruptions to energy supplies, shipping, insurance, infrastructure investments, and global markets can hurt China too.
During the audience discussion, Zhang talked about energy security. He argued that China’s domestic energy infrastructure, industrial capacity, and efforts to diversify its energy sources could help it during supply disruptions, especially compared with manufacturing economies that rely heavily on imported energy. He suggested instability in the Strait of Hormuz might hit China very differently than it would hit Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, or the Philippines.
That’s a fair distinction. Energy vulnerability depends on import dependence, domestic production, electricity generation, strategic reserves, transport routes, and how well industries can adjust to price changes. But being more resilient in some areas doesn’t make China immune to a long energy crisis, particularly given how deeply it’s involved in global manufacturing and trade.
Zhang also raised the possibility of more Chinese material assistance to Iran, including through transport routes via Pakistan. He openly admitted he had no evidence of Chinese transfers of military-use equipment. So his suggestions about such assistance, and about China possibly shaping diplomatic or logistical arrangements behind the scenes, are hypotheses, not established developments.
What the Iran case shows is that Chinese foreign policy rests on several overlapping calculations: energy security, commercial ties, diplomatic influence, regional stability, and competition with the United States. Depending on the conflict, they can point in different directions.
Generational Differences and the Question of Strategic Patience
Another part of the talk that stood out to me was Zhang’s discussion of generational differences in China. He suggests that younger Chinese intellectuals may be forming attitudes toward the West and China’s international role that differ from those of the reform era.
During the discussion, Zhang described his father’s generation as having grown up with high expectations of Western education, technology, and economic development. He used his own experience of studying in the United States to show how those expectations can change. His father had encouraged an American education, as many Chinese families did. Zhang came away with a more critical view of parts of Western political and economic life.
I like this anecdote because it shows how attitudes change through more than government policy. Education, economic growth, direct experience, and the gap between expectation and reality all play a part. A society that once focused on learning from more advanced countries may develop different expectations as its own industry, science, and technology grow. That’s even more likely when younger generations grow up with domestic infrastructure and technological achievements as an everyday fact of life.
Zhang believes some younger Chinese intellectuals are returning to Maoist ideas and want a more assertive international role for China, especially on Palestine, Iran, and countries that challenge American influence. But the experiences and online examples he gives don’t show that all younger Chinese share these preferences. They also don’t show that these views have become dominant among the institutions that make foreign policy.
One of the most useful exchanges in the discussion came when an audience member asked whether Zhang’s expectation of a more confrontational Chinese foreign policy might reflect his own generational preferences rather than where Beijing is actually heading.
The participant suggested that China’s reluctance to respond directly to outside pressure could be deliberate strategic patience. The goal would be to protect economic strength, diplomatic flexibility, and long-term planning, rather than get pulled into confrontations that might benefit other countries more than China.
Zhang acknowledged that his interpretation was shaped by his generation, and that Chinese academic and policy circles hold different views on strategic patience. He still argued that some younger thinkers increasingly question whether restraint makes sense as international competition heats up.
I think this exchange is useful because it separates Zhang’s analysis of existing policy from his personal expectations. He clearly favors a more assertive approach in some situations, especially on Iran. But his preference doesn’t mean China’s leadership will adopt it. And keeping multiple diplomatic relationships doesn’t necessarily mean indecision.
Political institutions have to weigh economic growth, financial stability, energy needs, trade, security commitments, and the costs of confrontation. Those material conditions keep shaping policy even when intellectual and generational attitudes change.
Is China’s Ambiguity a Weakness or a Strategy?
After Zhang’s talk and the discussion that followed, I kept coming back to one question. I think it deserves more attention than the assumption that China will eventually be forced to choose between its historical political commitments and its economic interests.
Zhang stresses the costs of overlapping commitments, and the disagreements involving Iran, the UAE, Israel, and Palestine show those costs are real. But staying in touch with rival governments also creates diplomatic openings that would vanish if a country committed to a single regional coalition. The Saudi-Iranian agreement is a good example.
The two cases are worth telling apart. A foreign policy with no clear priorities and one that deliberately keeps several priorities can look the same from the outside. Both avoid decisions that would damage key relationships. The reasoning behind them can be completely different.
It also helps to separate neutrality, nonalignment, and strategic balancing, which people often treat as the same thing. A country can keep commercial and diplomatic ties with opposing governments without being neutral on every political or military issue. It can support certain international principles without accepting the full strategic agenda of every state that shares them.
China’s Middle East policy fits these distinctions. Beijing has taken explicit positions on Palestinian statehood, Iranian sovereignty, regional security, and negotiations, while keeping economic relationships across competing alignments.
That doesn’t erase the contradictions Zhang identifies. But it suggests some of them may be the practical cost of preserving flexibility, rather than temporary problems waiting for a more rigid alignment to solve them.
Whether that approach lasts depends on things that are hard to predict. These include what China’s regional partners expect, how intense future conflicts get, what it costs to maintain certain relationships, and whether diplomatic engagement keeps paying off in ways exclusive alignment wouldn’t.
A Multipolar World Does Not Eliminate Contradictions
There’s a connection between Zhang’s talk and the argument in my earlier article on Mercouris, even though the two researchers come at the changing international system from different directions.
Mercouris looks at a world where Europe no longer sits at the political and strategic center that shaped so much of history. Zhang looks at a country whose growing influence has created responsibilities and relationships far beyond the circumstances in which its earlier foreign-policy traditions formed.
For one, the challenge is adjusting to lost centrality. For the other, it’s managing the consequences of rising influence. Both require institutions to rethink assumptions that worked under earlier conditions but no longer explain the environment they operate in.
A more multipolar world doesn’t mean every major power gets a tidy group of partners or its own sphere of influence, free of contradictions and outside constraints. Economic and technological interdependence means governments cooperate in one area while competing in another. Decisions made for domestic economic reasons can have international consequences nobody anticipated.
China’s relationships with Iran, Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE show how cooperation and competition can overlap in the same region. Sometimes that creates room for mediation. Sometimes it produces disagreements that commercial incentives can’t resolve.
That’s also why I’m wary of descriptions of the world as splitting into two coherent blocs, the West on one side and an increasingly unified non-Western world on the other.
Governments that cooperate with China on trade or infrastructure don’t automatically share Beijing’s strategic priorities.
Iran and the UAE have competing territorial claims despite their close ties with China. India and China have large commercial links alongside unresolved security disputes. Countries across the Global South differ widely in their economies, histories, diplomatic goals, and approaches to security. Treating them as a single political movement with identical priorities is misleading.
Several influential centers of power can help countries diversify their relationships and reduce dependence on any one institution. But it can also make diplomacy harder, because those centers don’t converge just because they all want more independence from an established order.
Political Models and the Difficulty of Recognizing Change
As an AI researcher, I see another connection in Zhang’s talk, this one to something I wrote about in A Better World Begins With Seeing Clearly: the limits of the models we use to interpret reality.
Whether it’s AI, scientific theories, economic forecasts, or political institutions, we depend on models that simplify a complex environment enough to let us make decisions. Those models are shaped by information, assumptions, historical experience, and the goals they were built for.
A foreign policy developed when economic integration and market access were the top priorities may struggle once military competition, sanctions, disrupted supply chains, and geopolitical fragmentation carry more weight. Likewise, a policy built mainly on historical political solidarity may struggle to fit the large commercial relationships formed over decades of integration.
Neither approach is automatically wrong. You can’t judge either one without considering the circumstances where it developed and the problems it was meant to solve.
In machine learning, a model can work well on the data distribution it was trained on and then become unreliable when conditions change. The worst case is when it keeps giving confident outputs without noticing that the assumptions behind its past performance no longer apply.
Political institutions face a related problem, though human societies are far more complex than computational systems. Governments aren’t algorithms running fixed instructions. Institutions contain competing interests, political incentives, historical memories, public expectations, and people who can revise their interpretations. Their decisions also change how other actors behave, so they alter the very environment they’re trying to understand.
That makes political judgment especially hard. A government can adopt a strategy based on reasonable expectations about how other countries will respond, then find that those countries read its actions differently and react in ways that undercut the original assumptions.
China may see a commercial agreement with a Gulf country as ordinary economic cooperation, while Iran reads certain diplomatic statements as a shift in Beijing’s political position. China may consider its trade with Israel compatible with supporting Palestinian statehood, while critics see it as inconsistent with the commitments Beijing professes.
The actions themselves don’t carry one universally accepted meaning. Governments and societies interpret them through their own interests, experiences, and expectations.
That’s why I think geopolitical analysis gets less reliable when we assume one country fully understands the international system while everyone else is stuck in outdated assumptions. China has no monopoly on geopolitical wisdom. Neither do the United States, Russia, Europe, Iran, or anyone else. None of them is uniquely good at recognizing its interests or predicting the consequences of its decisions.
Every political system can misread other countries’ intentions, underestimate the costs of its actions, or cling to explanations that sound coherent but fit changing circumstances poorly. The test is whether its institutions can spot those limits and adjust before the consequences become harder to reverse.
Understanding China’s Future Without Assuming We Already Know It
Near the end of his presentation, Zhang suggests the intensifying conflicts in the Middle East may eventually force China to set clearer priorities between its economic relationships and its political commitments. That applies especially to Iran and to countries with close security ties to the United States.
He expects Iran’s strategic weight to grow, and thinks Beijing may move toward a more openly supportive position, particularly if Chinese policymakers decide the current balancing approach no longer protects China’s long-term interests. But other outcomes are possible. China could deepen cooperation with Iran without a formal military alignment. It could keep trading with the Gulf states and Israel. It could adjust particular policies without fundamentally changing its regional strategy.
The difficulty with predicting any of this is that foreign policy depends on more than ideology or strategic calculation. It also depends on things nobody can know in advance: regional security, domestic politics, energy markets, trade, and what other major powers do.
Zhang explains the pressures on China well. But naming the pressures doesn’t tell us how they’ll be resolved.
After watching his talk, my main takeaway isn’t that China is preparing a radical overhaul of its foreign policy, as the video’s promotional title might suggest. It’s that China’s international behavior becomes easier to understand once you recognize the different historical experiences and practical interests behind its decisions.
The Maoist tradition helps explain why national liberation movements and political solidarity have carried so much weight in Chinese thinking about the world. The Dengist tradition helps explain the extensive economic relationships built during decades of reform and integration. Under Xi Jinping, China has expanded its diplomatic engagement with regional conflicts while keeping many of the commercial relationships and strategic constraints it inherited.
Indeed, the symposium host captured this generational dimension with a humorous remark at the end of Zhang’s presentation:
Behind the humor was an interesting observation about how some younger Chinese intellectuals are rediscovering political ideas that previous generations had gradually moved away from during the economic reform period, although whether this renewed interest will translate into a lasting change in China’s foreign policy remains uncertain.
These influences can coexist even when they create tension. Governments don’t have to organize every relationship around a single ideological principle or economic goal. But coexisting doesn’t guarantee that competing expectations can always be reconciled.
In my earlier article about Mercouris, I explored the possibility that Europe is struggling to adapt to a system where its historical position can’t be taken for granted. Zhang’s talk adds another dimension to the same transformation. Countries that gain influence also have to adapt, because expanding relationships and responsibilities create contradictions that counted for less when their role was smaller.
I think that’s a useful reminder that geopolitical power doesn’t free anyone from outside constraints.
It can have strategic partnerships without controlling its partners’ behavior. It can take part in negotiations without being able to guarantee the outcome.
We also shouldn’t assume that replacing a unipolar order with a multipolar one will automatically make the world more peaceful or balanced. Several powerful states can reproduce many of the problems of a single dominant power, if each becomes convinced that its own security, history, or strategic goals justify ignoring everyone else’s interests.
This brings me back to the relationship between intelligence and judgment that I wrote about in my earlier articles. Spotting geopolitical opportunities doesn’t mean a government understands the long-term consequences of pursuing them. And building an internally consistent explanation of world events doesn’t guarantee that it matches reality.
A better understanding of the world takes more than identifying which countries are getting stronger or weaker. It means recognizing how their interests intersect, where their interpretations differ, what evidence backs their expectations, and how their decisions shape other societies’ responses.
Maybe the deepest connection between Mercouris and Zhang is that both describe countries facing an international environment that no longer fits the assumptions they inherited. Europe is dealing with declining relative centrality. China is dealing with the difficulties of expanding influence. Neither situation fits a simple story of success or failure.
A more multipolar world may give countries room to build independent relationships and new forms of cooperation. But making use of that room will take institutions that can recognize competing interests, question their own assumptions, and accept that influence over international affairs isn’t the same as control over it.
That, to me, is the biggest question Sheng Zhang’s presentation raises. It isn’t whether China will become more assertive, or which historical tradition will win out. It’s whether China’s leaders and institutions can handle the responsibilities of growing influence without assuming that every contradiction has to be resolved through confrontation or exclusive alignment.




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